[OPINION] Guns and ballots: The deadly race for political power

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Election-related violence is deeply embedded in the Philippine political landscape, where assassinations, intimidation, and private armed groups are routine tools for securing power. Public figures who trivialize, or even endorse, such violence further desensitize the public, reinforcing its normalization.

During a recent campaign rally at Club Filipino in San Juan, former president Rodrigo Duterte, while endorsing opposition candidates for the May elections, suggested that bombing certain senators could create vacancies for his preferred candidates. He stated, “What should we do? Well, let’s kill the senators now to create vacancies.” He further remarked, “If we could kill 15 senators, we can get them all in.” Adding to this, he said, “Talking of opportunities, maybe the only way to do this is to set off a bomb.” Rather than sparking outrage, his remarks were met with laughter, a chilling reflection of how deeply violence is embedded in political discourse.

This is not new. 

During the 2016 presidential debate, Duterte openly challenged his opponent, Mar Roxas, suggesting that the ability to kill was a prerequisite for leadership. “If you don’t know how to kill a person and you’re afraid to die, that’s the problem — you cannot be a president.” Such rhetoric not only normalizes violence but glorifies it as a political strategy, further undermining democratic principles.

Political assassinations have become a defining feature of Philippine elections. In If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Fatal Violence Against Politicians in the Philippines, political analyst Peter Kreuzer examines the persistence of election-related killings and the systemic forces that sustain them. He argues that violence is not just a consequence of power struggles but an entrenched mechanism of governance, where eliminating rivals is often seen as a legitimate path to power.

As the 2025 elections approach, the Commission on Human Rights has already documented a surge in politically motivated killings. Assassinations of local executives and candidates have been reported in Zamboanga del Sur and Maguindanao, along with the killings of barangay officials in Leyte and Ilocos Norte. The December 7, 2024, ambush of Ponciano Onia, president of the Association of Barangay Captains in Bulacan, further underscores the escalating violence. 

In 2024, a year before the midterm senatorial elections, the Philippine National Police (PNP) recorded 120 suspected incidents of election-related violence, with 12 cases officially validated. These figures reflect a continuing trend of political violence from the previous year.

During the 2023 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections, the PNP documented 695 violations of the Omnibus Election Code and 2,013 violations of Republic Act No. 10591, the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act. In the weeks leading up to the October 30, 2023, elections, 29 confirmed incidents of election-related violence resulted in multiple fatalities, highlighting the persistent danger surrounding Philippine elections.

Long history

Earlier studies have documented the long-standing history of electoral violence in the Philippines. Smith and Reyes analyzed data from the Global Terrorism Database, revealing a significant rise in election-related violence, with 30 incidents in 2004, 57 in 2007, 199 in 2010, 496 in 2013, and 484 in 2016. Similarly, The Asia Foundation (2017) recorded 230 cases of election-related violence in 2016, the highest in their dataset, along with 229 cases in 2007, 180 in 2010, and 81 in 2013.

Deinla et al. analyzed election-related violence from 2013 to 2019, categorizing incidents as shootings, ambushes, bombings, assassinations, stabbings, arson, kidnappings, physical assaults, and threats or harassment.

Political analyst Peter Kreuzer (2023) further examined election-related violence from 2006 to 2023, revealing a disturbingly high number of political assassinations.

His research recorded 1,497 assassination attempts against incumbents and candidates, with 312 politicians wounded and 147 surviving assassination attempts unharmed. The 2016 national elections recorded the highest number of election-related violent incidents, with 133 cases. Local-level politicians, particularly barangay officials, have been disproportionately targeted. Although election-related violent incidents dropped sharply to 29 cases in 2023 local election, political assassinations remained a persistent issue, with most perpetrators never brought to justice.

One of the deadliest election-related attacks in Philippine history occurred during the 2010 national elections. The 2009 Maguindanao Massacre remains the most notorious case, where 57 unarmed civilians, including journalists, were murdered while en route to file candidacy papers. This massacre, the largest mass killing of journalists ever recorded globally, underscored the extreme levels of electoral violence in the country.

Waves of warlordism

Warlordism has been a major force behind election-related violence in the Philippines, enabling criminal politicians to thrive in electoral races. It dates back to the post-World War II period when politically ambitious war veterans formed private militias, using their wartime weapons and loyal followers to establish local fiefdoms. During the brief restoration of the Philippine Commonwealth, some of these veterans became hired enforcers, or “goons,” for national and local politicians.

A second wave of warlordism emerged under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos (1965–1986), who militarized his rule by turning the armed forces into his private army and using local warlords as death squads against political opponents and rebels. Even after Marcos’s ouster in 1986, his successor, Corazon Aquino, failed to dismantle these private militias, allowing warlordism to persist. Warlords —before, during, and after the martial law era (1972–1981) — have maintained power through violence, using their private armies to safeguard their interests in illegal activities such as gambling, drug trafficking, smuggling, and resource exploitation (Patino & Velasco, 2004).

By 2001, military reports estimated that around 100 private armies were responsible for 80% of election-related violence. A special task force attributed 68 of the 98 election-related deaths that year to these groups. These “goons” employed various tactics to rig elections, including ballot theft, destruction of voter lists, disruption of voter transport, and ballot box snatching to facilitate fraud (Patino & Velasco, 2004). In some cases, they created chaos in polling precincts to replace genuine ballots with fabricated ones.

Sociologist Randy David (2009) described this phenomenon as “the colonization of the weak state by local warlords recycled as public officials.” Election-related violence underscores the fragility of state institutions and the failure of the criminal justice system to uphold electoral integrity and voter rights. Although the 1986 People Power Revolution successfully ended Marcos’s authoritarian rule, it failed to establish a justice system grounded in democratic ideals such as equality, transparency, and accountability. Philippine democracy remains plagued by entrenched patronage politics, unchecked political power, and a slow, highly politicized justice system that favors the elite.

As the country heads into the midterm elections, the battle between the Duterte and Marcos factions will be a defining test of this enduring system. Both leaders have historically relied on warlords and private armed groups to maintain political dominance, reinforcing the cycle of electoral violence and patronage politics that continues to shape the nation’s democratic landscape. – Rappler.com

Chris N. Magno, Associate Professor of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University, specializes in crime mapping, the politics of crime, and the intersections of violence, governance, and social justice. He earned his master’s degree in Sociology from UP Diliman and his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Indiana University Bloomington. His recent publication introduces the term criminal populism, exploring how politicians leverage their own crimes as political capital.