2 days ago
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Our relationship with China has reached its most turbulent point yet. Arguably, we are still dealing with the aftermath of Duterte’s unhealthy China pivot. Manila and Beijing have grown more assertive in their claims within contested waters. And locally, the POGO crisis has exposed its extensive links to transnational crime, raising serious questions about the extent of Chinese influence in the country. Given this context, reaching the chilliest point in Philippine-China relations seemed inevitable.
But this is not to suggest that engaging with China is futile and unwise. On the contrary, as spaces for building mutual trust shrink amid rising tensions, it is all the more important to explore new avenues that could serve as entry points for improving ties.
The upcoming midterm elections present an opportunity to do just that, especially with the spotlight on the country’s China policy amid recent developments. As this unfolds, the electorate should be cautious of the tendency to over-politicize China-related issues at the expense of a more thoughtful approach to improving bilateral relations.
Our growing China problem
The early days of the Marcos presidency showed promising signs of continuity with Duterte’s China policy. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit in July 2022, just days after Marcos assumed office, marked the administration’s first official diplomatic engagement. This was followed months later by a productive state visit to China, where both sides signed several agreements, including one to establish a direct line of communication in the West Philippine Sea.
A month later, the initial rapport was quick to give way to mutual doubts as the Marcos administration unveiled plans to establish four new EDCA sites under the country’s alliance with the United States. This came amid China’s more frequent maritime activities in contested waters and heightened tensions in the Taiwan strait, which provided the Marcos government with a strategic rationale for the move.
On the domestic front, POGOs in the country, which expanded in number under Duterte’s China accommodation, were raided and shut down as they were found to be local hubs for various types of transnational crime. The turning point came with the high-profile involvement of former Bamban Mayor Alice Guo, a local chief executive whose influence and position allowed a particular POGO hub in the province of Tarlac to stay under the radar until its recent exposé. Senate investigations into Guo’s case essentially brought awareness to the domestic consequences of Duterte’s China pivot. President Marcos eventually made the right yet overdue decision to ban POGOs, acknowledging their harmful and unsustainable presence in the country.
Coupled with the nation’s ongoing conflict with China, the POGO fiasco surfaced questions about China’s growing influence operations, which ultimately cultivated a deep sense of alarm about the extent of Beijing’s reach in the daily lives of the average Filipino.
Inadvertently, these events also collectively emboldened nascent sinophobic tendencies as the nation grappled with both the unknown and the untrusted. To this end, those seeking power can easily exploit these tendencies to present themselves as champions of righteousness, risking the oversimplification of complex issues that deserve serious consideration.
Moving on from the jet-ski rhetoric
Marcos has portrayed the upcoming mid-term elections as a choice between going back to the dark ages of the Dutertes, or moving forward with the promise of a “Bagong Pilipinas.” If recent polls are any indication, the Marcos government is likely to retain strong popular support for the president’s agenda.
On the foreign policy front, this means reinforcing the administration’s anti-China rhetoric — a strategy that resonates with the Filipino public’s longstanding distrust and negative sentiment toward China. Indeed, this is a low-hanging fruit for any political aspirant.
Early in the campaign period, senatorial candidates were ready to express their support towards this agenda. President Marcos himself has drawn the line for both the electorate and the aspirants. For him, the upcoming elections is a simple choice between his slate of patriotic public servants ready to fight against foreign intrusion, and “Chinese lackeys” who are quick to entrust the Philippines as a province of China.
This is where potential dangers may emerge. If we are to treat our China policy as a key election issue this time around, framing it within the limiting context of pro versus anti positions sacrifices a deeper understanding of China’s rise and its consequences for the Philippines. Similarly, this zero-sum perspective potentially reduces China-related issues to fleeting populist narratives that fail to address perennial problems in our bilateral relations.
Duterte’s infamous jet-ski rhetoric is a classic example of these potential dangers. It is not the first time we have seen grand promises of defending what’s ours against intruders we repeatedly fail to (or refuse to) understand. On the other end of the spectrum is Marcos’ earlier loyalty to his predecessor’s policy of appeasing China. His complete about-face signals that foreign policy issues are deemed convenient by these elites only when they serve immediate factional interests.
Clearly, promises of being for or against China do not always guarantee outcomes — let alone peace with our neighbors. It is therefore important to look beyond the usual populist foreign policy discourses and seek concrete ways forward.
Finding the sweet spot in our China policy
Contrary to claims that China is set to be front and center this upcoming elections, domestic “gut issues” are still poised to dominate the Pinoy electorate’s decision calculus. Polls indicate that food security, job security, and corruption remain the top concerns for voters.
Should we insist on China figuring prominently this coming elections, our inquiries and skepticisms must touch on the intersection of foreign policy and these gut issues. For example, while tensions at sea can easily be articulated in the context of ensuring food security for the country, current discourses seldom touch on this aspect. How exactly does the current insecurity in the West Philippine Sea impact food prices inland, and more importantly, the livelihood of our fisherfolk? In light of this objective, what are concrete ways for China and the Philippines to jointly reap the bounty of the ocean, while still being faithful to realities of our respective claims?
Meanwhile, lessons from the POGO crisis and China’s expanding influence operations in critical sectors present an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of existing oversight, regulatory, and counterintelligence capabilities, particularly their ability to identify real and tangible threats. Raising the alarm should extend beyond suspected activities from China to all suspicious activities within our borders. This issue cuts to the core of anti-corruption efforts and public security — matters that directly affect the daily lives of Filipino voters.
Ultimately, asserting that China figures prominently in Philippine politics is also acknowledging China’s growing importance. This is especially true for neighbors which have learned to co-exist long before our current territorial disputes. Moving beyond a simple good-versus-bad narrative, the upcoming elections is also an opportunity to explore how we can improve the sorry state of our bilateral relations with China, without sacrificing an inch of Philippine territory.
We have yet to see a serious discussion around this potential “sweet spot” towards our China policy. As campaign promises seem to be creating localized “China Threat” narratives in the Philippines, educated voters should seek to inquire into the possibility of a clear and balanced approach this time around — something that we have yet to see inform our overall engagement with our most important neighbor. – Rappler.com
Enrico V. Gloria is an assistant professor of international relations (on study leave ) at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, and a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University. He writes about China’s rise, the bilateral relationship between China and the Philippines, as well as their respective foreign policies. His research has appeared in The Pacific Review, Philippine Political Science Journal, Chinese Studies Journal, and the Journal of Contemporary China, among others.
