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At least some Filipinos must be wondering: whatever happened to the Maharlika Investment Fund, which is being managed by the Maharlika Investment Corporation (MIC)?
Well, we know for a fact that the three-year term of MIC’s first president, Rafael “Joel” Consing Jr., is nearly up. It’s been reported that Finance Undersecretary Ma. Angela “Angel” Ignacio is being considered to succeed Consing. The possible change has been linked to supposed dissatisfaction with the fund’s performance (aside from Consing’s reported health issues).
Recall that when President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed the fund into law on July 18, 2023, then-finance secretary Benjamin Diokno called it a “game-changing measure.” We were promised faster infrastructure development, more foreign investment, and high-quality jobs. But how much of that promise has materialized?
Where the money went
According to MIC’s unaudited financial disclosure for the first half of 2026, cumulative deployed capital had reached P24.7 billion by June 30. That’s only about a third of the P75 billion originally contributed by the Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines.
MIC still held P53 billion in cash and cash equivalents, down from P71.1 billion at end-2025. In addition, another P50 billion subscribed by the national government remained unreleased.
The largest recent investment was a P15-billion short-term loan to Petron to finance fuel imports and operating needs, against the backdrop of the US–Iran war and the global oil shock this year. MIC says the loan supports fuel security and carries prevailing interest rates.
That could be useful during an energy crisis, but exactly what financing gap required Maharlika’s involvement? Petron already has other funding arrangements, as the MIC itself acknowledges. The public deserves evidence of the additional fuel supplies or other benefits enabled by this particular loan.
Before this, MIC also acquired additional shares of port operator Asian Terminals in the first half of 2026. Buying shares from existing owners gives Maharlika a claim on future profits. The transaction itself doesn’t finance the construction of new ports, however, and any subsequent improvements in capacity or logistics need to be demonstrated separately.
Meanwhile, MIC exited its short-term financing of Makilala Mining on June 5 by transferring the loan to Equinaire Holdings. MIC reported a 12.5% net annualized return in dollars or approximately 25% in pesos. That deserves credit, although the annualized figures should not be mistaken for the percentage earned over the actual holding period.
Then there’s the much-publicized grid deal announced in January 2025. The proposed major investment through Synergy Grid and Development Philippines, which holds an indirect interest in the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, remained delayed.
Other initiatives are still underway. A July agreement with the Philippine National Oil Company, for instance, covers exploring a petroleum storage project in Bataan targeted for 2028.
What the profits show
To its credit, Maharlika seems somewhat profitable. MIC reported P1.24 billion in net income for the first half of 2026 and separately announced a P1.376-billion dividend remittance to the national government in June.
But if you dive deeper, you’ll see that the income comes from mainly cash and short-term placements that generated P1.14 billion in interest. Funds awaiting investment were placed primarily with government financial institutions.
In short, a large amount of money taken from state banks is just earning interest through placements primarily with state financial institutions.
Sure, this preserves liquidity or the ability to access money quickly — at least while deals are evaluated. But earning deposit interest hardly strengthens the rational of why we had to have Maharlika in the first place. It’s not exactly the promised game-changer.
Also, the headline P2.09 billion in portfolio returns includes P1.446 billion in unrealized gains, or increases in investment values that have not been realized through a sale. That’s roughly 69% of the total. Those gains can easily reverse when prices fall.
Running the institution also costs money, of course: operating expenses reached P170.8 million in the first half of 2026, including P111.8 million for professional services. Those costs need to be justified by returns and public benefits beyond what existing institutions could deliver.
Did you know that the president and CEO of MIC earns a salary of P2.5 million per month? Is it worth it, given MIC’s performance? And exactly how much are the other officials and directors earning?
The original problem
Of course, investment institutions take time to build. Pressuring managers to spend faster could produce worse or overly risky deals, and the unreleased government contribution reflects funding processes beyond MIC’s sole control.
But this brings us to Maharlika’s original problems. Recall that it didn’t create an extra P75 billion of national wealth or “surplus.” What it did, instead, was merely transfer resources from existing public institutions into a new investment vehicle. Those resources have alternative uses, including supporting the state banks’ development lending.
The value of the best forgone alternative is what economists like me call “opportunity cost.” Maharlika’s returns must be assessed against that opportunity cost, with allowance for the risks taken and the expense of running the fund.
Back in June 2023, 21 faculty members of the University of the Philippines School of Economics, myself included, published “Maharlika Investment Fund: Still beyond repair.” We questioned the fund’s unclear rationale, its competing financial and development objectives, and whether it could attract enough additional investment to justify the resources committed to it.
More than three years later, our concerns seem to be borne out. While Maharlika is earning money, its reliance on short-term placements and investments in established businesses leaves the promised additional development benefits unclear.
Likewise, the government must show what additional development Maharlika enables. How much private capital joined projects because of its involvement? Which investments would otherwise have lacked financing? What measurable improvements have reached consumers and communities?
At the very least, Congress should require a public accounting of each investment’s cost, realized earnings, risks, and development results. Large acquisitions and loans should also come with a clear explanation of why existing banks or government agencies couldn’t achieve the same objectives more effectively.
In conclusion, more than three years on, the Maharlika Investment Fund has turned out to be a nothing burger. I’m afraid that an upcoming change in leadership won’t resolve many of its fundamental problems. But as the current administration winds down, expect President Marcos to harp on its purported successes anyway. – Rappler.com
Jan Carlo “JC” Punongbayan, PhD, is an associate professor at the University of the Philippines School of Economics. His professional experience includes the Securities and Exchange Commission, the World Bank Office in Manila, the Far Eastern University Public Policy Center, and the National Economic and Development Authority. JC writes a weekly economics column for Rappler. He is also co-founder of UsapangEcon.com and co-host of Usapang Econ Podcast.
His first book, False Nostalgia: The Marcos “Golden Age” Myths and How to Debunk Them, was published by Ateneo de Manila University Press in February 2023. His second book, Twin Plagues: How Duterte and COVID-19 Wrecked the Philippine Economy, was published by Penguin Random House SEA in June 2026. Follow him on Instagram (@jcpunongbayan).
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