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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
IMPEACHMENT COURT
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PASAY CITY, METRO MANILA
IN RE: Case No. 03-2025
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF VICE-PRESIDENT
SARA ZIMMERMAN DUTERTE
REPLY
We, the undersigned Prosecutors duly appointed by the House of Representatives (“HOR”), in response to respondent Vice President Sara Zimmerman Duterte’s (“Duterte”) Answer Ad Cautelam dated June 17, 2025 (“Answer Ad Cautelam’), respectfully state:
TIMELINESS
1. On June 23, 2025, the Prosecutors received a copy of respondent Duterte’s Answer Ad Cautelam. Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials provides that the prosecutors may Reply within a non-extendible period of five (5) days fromreceipt of the Answer Ad Cautelam.
2. This Reply is timely filed.
COMMENT TO MISLEADING AND FALSE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS
3. At the onset, it must be pointed out that in the Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent Duterte had made several misleading and false material statements.
4. First, respondent Duterte claims that there are no Articles of Impeachment presently with the Honorable Impeachment Court because it ordered the “return” of the Articles of Impeachment. This is false.
5. The HOR has deferred receiving the Articles of Impeachment. Moreover, the Articles of Impeachment was attached to the Summons issued by the Honorable Impeachment Court. The fact that respondent Duterte was able to file an Answer Ad Cautelam contravenes her arguments. It is rather strange for respondent Duterte to argue that the Honorable Impeachment Court did not have in its possession the Articles of Impeachment when she admitted having received the same. The Articles of Impeachment are literally and figuratively with her and her defense team.
6. In any case, returning the Articles of Impeachment is not even a jurisdictional issue. The Honorable Impeachment Court did not lose jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the Articles of Impeachment to the HOR. The Order dated June 11, 2025 categorically states that despite the return of the Articles of Impeachment to the HOR, the case is not dismissed or terminated, to wit:
“That the Articles of Impeachment be returned to the House of Representatives, without dismissing or terminating the case, until such time that: xxx” (Emphasis supplied.)
7. The clear import of the Honorable Impeachment Court’s Order is that—despite the return of the Articles of Impeachment to the HOR—it continues to exercise jurisdiction over the case, as irrefutably manifested by its action of issuing the Summons together with a copy the Articles of Impeachment to respondent Duterte on the same day it ordered the return of the Articles of Impeachment to the HOR.
8. Second, respondent Duterte cited Proposed Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 1013, or the Revised Rules of Procedure in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials in claiming that no Articles of Impeachment were exhibited and presented to this Honorable Court. This is a false material statement.
9. The Honorable Impeachment Court itself cancelled the reading of the Articles of Impeachment by reason of mootness when the Senator-Judges took their oaths and constituted themselves as the Impeachment Court. Furthermore, this Proposed Senate {P.S.) Resolution No. 1013 was never adopted by the Senate. It was merely a proposal during the 17 Congress.
10. Third, it is basic that an impeachment proceeding is not a criminal proceeding? nor is it akin thereto. Impeachment is designed to remove the impeachable officer from office, not punish him or her. The defense ought to know that it is sui generis; neither civil, criminal, nor administrative in nature.
11. Fourth, respondent Duterte cited Balag v. Senate of the Philippines* (“Balag”} allegedly because it supported her contentions that (a} the Senate was not a continuing body; and (b) each Congress is separate and independent of each other.®
12. The interpretation and legal conclusion derived by respondent Duterte from Balag is absolutely contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in that case. In Balag, the Supreme Court stated in plain and categorical language that “[c]ertainly there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is ‘continuing’, as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members.”
13. However, in asserting in the Answer Ad Cautelam that it is a fundamental principle that the “Senate is not a continuing body,” respondent Duterte not only made a false statement or erroneous legal conclusion, but she had also entirely modified a Supreme Court decision.
14. Fifth, respondent Duterte cited Section 3, Rule II of the HOR Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (“HOR Rules”) in arguing that the Articles of Impeachment is insufficient. This is false and misleading. The Articles of Impeachment was initiated under Rule IV and not Rule Il. The provisions cited by respondent Duterte therefore do not apply. In any event, the Articles of Impeachment have sufficiently alleged the factual circumstances constituting the seven articles and even presented evidentiary matters. The Articles of Impeachment is without doubt complete and sufficient.
15. Sixth, respondent Duterte strongly objects to the use of her online broadcast/video livestream and subsequent interviews as basis for the charge of culpable violations of the Constitution and High Crimes in Article I.
16. Yet, she herself uses Karen Davila’s interview of Secretary General Reginald S. Velasco as basis for her defense (regarding the referral of the three earlier impeachment complaints to the Speaker). This selective and self-serving application of principles of law should not be countenanced. Respondent Duterte’s act ushers in unpredictable, partial, and selective justice based purely on her convenience and not on any recognized legal standard.
17. The deliberate resort to misleading and false arguments of respondent Duterte appears malicious and deceitful.
18. This is a serious offense. In fact, she violated Section 8, Canon II of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, which states as follows:
“Prohibition on misleading the court, tribunal, or other government agency. — A lawyer shall not misquote, misrepresent, or mislead the court as to the existence or the contents of any document, argument, evidence, law, or other legal authority, or pass off as one’s own the ideas or words of another, or assert as a fact that which has not been proven.”
19. This clearly shows that respondent Duterte continues to perpetuate falsehood, deception, and injustice by resorting to mislead this Honorable Impeachment Court with inaccuracies and false contentions. Accordingly, the Honorable Impeachment Court should not hesitate to impose sanctions.
OPPOSITION TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
20. In addition to the false and misleading statements in the Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent Duterte further seeks the dismissal of the Articles of Impeachment allegedly because: (a) it is void ab initio for violating the One-Year Bar Rule; and (b) there are no statements of ultimate facts.
On the One-Year Bar Rule-—
21. Respondent Duterte claims that the Articles of Impeachment is unconstitutional because the HOR violated Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the Constitution, which prohibits the initiation of more than one impeachment proceedings within a period of one (1) year.
22. Respondent Duterte argues that the HOR withheld the referral of the first three (3) impeachment complaints. She insists that her constitutional right to due process was supposedly violated because she was not notified of the impeachment nor given the opportunity to file an answer. Finally, she posits that the Honorable Impeachment Court lacks jurisdiction allegedly because the Senate is not a continuing body and each Congress is separate and independent of each other.
23. The arguments are baseless.
24. It must be emphasized that the HOR has the exclusive power to initiate impeachment proceedings. As such, it enjoys the presumption of regularity® and legality.” Absent any strong and convincing proof to the contrary, it is deemed conclusive upon this Honorable Impeachment Court, especially since this was an official act of a co-equal legislative body.
25. Precisely to put this issue to rest. the HOR has already certified that it did not violate Section 3 (5). Article XI of the Constitution when it impeached respondent Duterte. This certification issued by a co-equal and independent body is conclusive.
26. In any event, the Prosecutors maintain their position that the HOR did not violate any provisions of the Constitution, law, or their own Rules, for the following reasons:
27. First, the One-Year Bar Rule was never circumvented. Only one impeachment proceeding against respondent Duterte was “initiated.” Initiation occurred when the Fourth Impeachment Complaint was verified and filed by at least 1/3 of the members of the House of Representatives’ on February 5, 2025.
28. Second, the argument that the HOR Secretary General supposedly failed “to immediately refer” the first complaint (December 2, 2024) is irrelevant. What is pertinent is that the first complaint was included in the Order of Business by the Speaker of the House within ten (10) session days from the filing thereof, in compliance with both the Constitution and the HOR Rules.
29. For clarity, the table below shows the session days vis-a-vis the calendar days:
Based on the above table, the three prior complaints for impeachment were all referred to the plenary within 10 session days.
30. The Verified Complaint for Impeachment which was signed by more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives was initiated and acted upon on the 10 session day from the filing of the first impeachment complaint. Any purported failure by the Secretary General for not “immediately” referring the impeachment complaint is immaterial. All three (3) complaints were included in the Order of Business on February 5, 2025, the tenth (10th) session day from December 2, 2024.
31. Third, there was no withholding of the first three (3) impeachment complaints to speak of. Jurisprudence allows multiple complaints to be filed before they are simultaneously referred to the proper committee. In Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives!! (“Francisco”), impeachment proceedings are initiated in one of two ways: (1) by the filing AND referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice; and (2) by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the HOR with its Secretary General.
32. Thus, initial action, which initiates the impeachment proceedings under the first mode, refers to the filing of the complaint AND referral or endorsement by the House to the Committee on Justice. Initial action by the HOR as a body is the referral to the Committee on Justice. Actions by the Secretary General or the Speaker alone do not constitute the “initial action” by the House.
33. On the other hand, in the second mode, respondent Duterte’s impeachment was initiated on February 5, 2025 when one-third of the HOR’s membership filed and verified the complaint before the Secretary General.
34. The Supreme Court has ruled in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice!’ that the HOR may wait for multiple impeachment complaints before simultaneously referring them all to the Committee on Justice, The number of complaints does not matter so long as the complaints have been referred within the given periods. This is to avoid senseless haste:
“Contrary to petitioner's emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment "proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint" to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a_word covers its enlarged and plural sense.
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time.
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory. For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner's stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line, It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed out "worms" in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.”
35. Clearly then, the action of the Secretary General to wait for the best matchstick to light the candle within the period allowed by the Constitution was sanctioned by the Constitution itself. To listen to the representatives of the people — because they needed time to study the complaints and come up with their own best version of the impeachment complaint — was the constitutionally and morally correct thing to do.
36. Respondent Duterte maliciously misleads this Honorable Impeachment Court when she compares her impeachment to the one in Francisco.
37. In this case, before the HOR filed its own impeachment complaint, not one of the first three impeachment complaints were referred to the House Committee on Justice. On the other hand, in Francisco, some representatives of the HOR filed a second impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was already referred to the House Committee on Justice:
“In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.” [Emphasis supplied]
On the Filing of an Answer to the HOR Impeachment—
38. There is no basis for respondent Duterte to argue that she was neither notified nor afforded an opportunity to file an answer to the impeachment complaint. The Committee on Justice shall conduct a hearing only when the impeachment complaint is initiated under Rule II of the HOR Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and if the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and in substance. Thereafter, it shall give notice to the respondents and allow them to file their answer, affidavits, and other pleadings. Upon the receipt of all the pleadings, the Committee shall decide if sufficient grounds for impeachment exist. If adequate reasons are present, the Committee will proceed with a hearing. This process is not applicable to a Rule IV complaint.
39. The House of Representatives is not required to hold committee hearings with respondent Duterte’s participation if it initiates impeachment by direct resolution of at least one-third (1/3) of all of its members, such as in this case.
40. Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution specifically states that “ijn case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same _ shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shail forthwith proceed.”
41. Rule IV of the HOR Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings likewise states that “[a] verified complaint/resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and in this case the verified complaint/ resolution shall be endorsed to the Senate in the same manner as an approved bill of the House.”
On the “Cross Over” from the 19 to the 20“ Congress—
42. The 1987 Constitution does not prohibit respondent Duterte’s impeachment by the 19th Congress and her trial by the 20% Congress. The only relevant time constraint under the Constitution is that no impeachment may be initiated more than once in a year. To be sure, the Senate is a continuing body.
43. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress, the Supreme Court made a distinction between Congress’s legislative and non-legislative functions. Even if Congress expires, its non-legislative functions continue. Non-legislative functions will not be affected by the change of its composition:
“The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its nonlegislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. In sum, despite the adjournment sine-die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.”
44. Here, when Congress sits for a non-legislative purpose, it cannot become functus officio until it has accomplished its purpose. When the Senate sits as an impeachment court, it does not become functus officio, even if its composition changes. Implied as well is the rule that the impeachment proceedings will not be terminated. The impeachment court must continue the proceedings where it left off. It will not become functus officio until it either convicts or acquits the impeached officer.
45. The Constitution was directly enacted by the people. It is not a lawyer’s document. Its provisions are read verba legis or given their plain meaning and applied without interpretation.!7
46. Thus, the Constitution refers to the Senate as an institution when it says that “in case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.” Respondent Duterte erroneously asserts that the evidence must be received by the same Senators who received the Articles of Impeachment transmitted by the HOR.
47. The above is consistent with doctrine that the Senate is a continuing body. In the cases of Arnault v. Nazareno, (‘Amauit’); Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,” (“Neri’); and Balag: the Senate is considered as a continuing body or institution “which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives” and is “not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members.”
48. The nature of the Senate as a continuing body is likewise reflected in the discussions of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution.
49. In defending the proposal for a bicameral legislature, Commissioner Gregorio J. Tingson noted that being a continuing body is an important feature of the legislature:
“As to representation, the Upper House provides national representation which the Lower House cannot attain. In so doing, a bicameral form fosters national unity and consciousness, rather than a representative form merely based on the respective districts of the members of legislature. The scope of legislative responsibility is, therefore, unified with the presence of the Senate. One of the most important features, of course is that the Senate insures stability of governmental policies as the Senate is a continuing body.”
50. Although the cases of Neri and Balag qualified this “continuing body” nature of the Senate as not extending to its “day-to-day business” and “all pending matters and proceedings, ie. unpassed bills and even legislative investigations”, this does not extend to the all-important task of sitting as an impeachment court.
51. When the Senate sits as an Impeachment Court, it is not exercising a legislative function;?% thus, it is not bound by the rules on legislative sessions and adjournment, including the requirement to archive or effectively terminate all unconcluded matters at the time of final adjournment.
52. The constitutional duty of deciding an impeachment case should not be affected by the fact that the Senate’s composition changes as the institution crosses over to the next Congress. Taken to its extreme, the view that an impeachment trial terminates upon the end of a legislative session would render the entire process susceptible to indefinite delays, stonewalling and filibustering - enabling the Senate to avoid reaching a decision simply by letting time pass until the end of a Congress.
53. The doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction can be applied analogously in this case when the Senate is sitting as anImpeachment Court. As held in the recent case of People v. Mendez:**
“Considering the court's jurisdiction, therefore, it is of no consequence that the amount of taxes later proved to be due from Joel is less or more, than that alleged in the Information. The court will not be deprived of its acquired jurisdiction. In this regard, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin 8S. Caguioa stresses that “folnce jurisdiction is vested by the material allegations in the Information, it remains vested irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims asserted therein." Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo adds: "as long as the allegations in the information constitute the elements of the offense charged, then the court shail have jurisdiction over the offense, even if it was subsequently determined during trial that the /sic] some of the allegations were not established. This is the embodiment of the doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction, which reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case." [Emphasis and underscoringsupplied]
54. Thus, when the Senate assumes jurisdiction of an impeachment case, when it receives the duly endorsed Articles of Impeachment for trial, it cannot be removed from this jurisdiction until it fully exercises and performs its constitutional mandate —ie., the conduct of a trial and the rendition of a decision of either conviction or acquittal. The contention that Congress’s rule on unfinished business extends to impeachment proceedings is therefore unconstitutional.
On the issue of “ultimate facts’—
55. Respondent Duterte also makes the bold assertion that the Articles of Impeachment do not state ultimate facts.25 She goes on to cite the 2017 case of Guillermo v. Philippine Information Agency.
56. Respondent Duterte’s assertion manifests that she is unaware of the amendment to the rules. Starting 2019, the Supreme Court has already required the complaint to state not only ultimate facts but also evidentiary matters.
57. Respondent Duterte is apparently confused as to the purpose of the rule on ultimate facts. The rule simply requires that a complaint must allege “the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on whose existence the cause of action rests.” Ultimate facts are those facts which the expected evidence will support. On the other hand, evidentiary facts are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion.
58. To the contrary, the Articles of Impeachment allege the ultimate facts, Le., the principal. determinative. and constitutive elements of each and every article of impeachment: to present pieces of evidence in support of each and every article of impeachment: and to conclude thereafter that respondent Duterte must be found guilty of all articles of impeachment. be removed from office, and be perpetually disqualified from holding office.
REPLY TO DISCUSSION
On Article I—
59. In the Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent Duterte argues that the First Ground in the Articles of Impeachment does not constitute an impeachable offense and that no high crimes were committed because the Articles of Impeachment allegedly failed to allege the presence of all the elements of the crimes she is accused of.
60. The arguments are puerile.
61. Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.
62. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear-cut definition or even a standard therefor. Thus, contrary to the arguments of respondent Duterte, there is no requirement to allege the elements of other high crimes. There aren’t any.
63. Nevertheless, the Articles of Impeachment have clearly and sufficiently stated “ultimate facts” and substantiated the presence of Other High Crimes with evidence showing that respondent Duterte admitted that she had contracted an assassin to kill key officials of the Philippine Government.
64. The Articles of Impeachment clearly alleged facts and circumstances showing that respondent Duterte resorted to threats of bodily harm and assassination of the President, the First Lady, and the Speaker of the HOR. The Articles of Impeachment clearly mentioned that respondent Duterte entered into a contract to kill. Undoubtedly, these allegations prove her commission of High Crimes.
65. High Crimes are acts of “sufficient seriousness as to justify the belief that there was a grave violation of the trust imposed on the official sought to be impeached,” [Rec. Const. Comm’n No. 040 (July 26, 1986)] even if they may not necessarily be chargeable in a court. According to the Journal of the Constitutional Commission, High Crimes pertain to indictable offenses that would render an official unworthy to remain in office and refer to those acts or omissions punishable by law, which are of such enormous gravity that they strike at the very life of the orderly working of government.
66. Grave Threats is an indictable offense. Under the Revised Penal Code, it is committed by any person when he or she shall threaten another with the affliction upon the person, honor or, property of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime. The penalty for the crime varies depending on whether the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing a condition and said offender shall have attained his purpose, or if made in writing or through a middleman.
67. Respondent Duterte has already admitted and confirmed in several interviews that: First, that she has specifically directed a person to kill the President, the First Lady, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives; Second, that she contracted person has already agreed to carry out her instructions. This is not merely a threat but a contract to kill to be performed by an unnamed contracted assassin.
68. Respondent Duterte has already been charged by the National Bureau of Investigation for the crimes of Grave Threats and Inciting to Sedition before the Department of Justice.
69. The declaration of a threat of an assassin contracted to kill the President, the First Lady, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives is inciting to sedition, especially because she is the constitutional successor of the President.
70. The inflammatory words of respondent Duterte and those acting in concert with her were made in open defiance of executive power. They are not merely threatening and seditious, they could also constitute an act of terrorism.
71. Finally, respondent Duterte argues that the Prosecutors did not offer any proof of her entering into a contract to kill. This argument lacks logic. It was Respondent Duterte herself who admitted in several interviews that she had contracted an unnamed assassin.
72. In sum, the admitted fact of plotting the death of the President, the First Lady, and the Speaker of the House goes beyond Grave Threats, Inciting to Sedition, and Terrorism and are constitutive of an impeachable offense.
On Article II-—
73. In her Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent Duterte attempts to reduce the issue to mere compliance with Joint Circular No. 2015-01 and the General Appropriations Act. Specifically, respondent Duterte makes the following claims:
(a) There is no final decision declaring the disbursements “illegal, unjustifiable, exorbitant, excessive, extravagant, and/or unconscionable” and that the 19th Congress “cannot arrogate upon itself the functions belonging exclusively to the Commission on Audit and ultimately, the Supreme Court.%? Without a final declaration from COA, the 19t* Congress cannot posit ultimate facts relative to the disbursements in question.#
(b) There was no violation of the Joint Circular or General Appropriations Act.3+ The documents in question were the very documents submitted to the COA in compliance with the requirements of the Joint Circular, and the documentary evidence of payment for the confidential funds are consistent with its nature.35
(c) There was no finding by the Commission on Audit that respondent Duterte malversated the confidential funds, and the grounds relied upon by the COA in disallowing a portion of the funds were only matters of form that the Joint Circular does not prescribe.
(d) Finally, that the Fourth Impeachment Complaint does not state ultimate facts because the claims therein are mere speculations or conclusions of law.37
74. These arguments do not deserve merit. It must be emphasized that respondent Duterte is being charged under Article 2 for her betrayal of public trust when she malversated confidential funds and suppressed information on the utilization of such funds. The issue on proper compliance with COA regulations is immaterial considering that her offense boils down to malversation.
75. In her Answer ad Cautelam, Respondent Duterte merely proffers general denials which do not address the misuse of confidential funds. These general denials are not supported by any legal basis or factual evidence.
76. First, and contrary to respondent Duterte’s claim that the allegations under Article 2 are based on mere speculations, there are uncontroverted testimonies from multiple key individuals involved in the disbursement of confidential funds of the OVP and DepEd establishing the following:
(e) The Special Disbursing Officers (“SDOs”) were simply instructed by respondent Duterte to turn over the confidential funds to the officers of the Vice-Presidential Security and Protection Group (“VPSG’). During the November 25, 2025 hearing before the Committee on Good Governance and Public Accountability, Ms. Gina Acosta of the OVP and Mr. Edward Fajarda of the DepEd made categorical admissions.
(b) Signatories to the Liquidation Reports were only made to sign the same and were kept in the dark on the actual utilization of the confidential fund.%8 In particular, Ms. Rhunna Catalan of the DepEd admitted that she was merely made to sign the Liquidation Report and did not have the opportunity to check the authenticity and correctness of the same.
(c) The Youth Leadership Summits were funded by the Philippine Army and/or the appropriate local government unit concerned and not by confidential funds despite the fact that the DepEd submitted four (4) Certifications misrepresenting that its confidential funds were used.
77. Furthermore, respondent Duterte did not deny the following:
(f) That confidential funds in large amounts were completely disbursed and utilized during a short period of time;
(g) The expenses were exorbitant and excessive and not commensurate to the purposes for which they were supposedly used;
(h) The documentary evidence of payment submitted by the OVP and DepEd had discrepancies and clear badges of forgery;” and
(i) Based on the verification made by the Philippine Statistics Authority on the existence of the recipients of the confidential funds, at least Two Hundred Fifty-Four Million Eight Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (PhP254,898,000.00) were disbursed to fictitious persons.”
78. The evidence on record shows that respondent Duterte masterminded the malversation of the confidential funds. Her subordinates testified that she orchestrated everything, signed, attested to, and/or otherwise approved the Physical and Financial Plans, Liquidation Forms and Accomplishment Forms submitted to the COA. Respondent Duterte did not rebut any of the above, evidently because she cannot disprove the truth.
79. Obviously, the statements of her subordinates are not “speculations”. They are well-documented information from key individuals who played material roles in the disbursement of confidential funds of the OVP and DepEd which were made under oath before the Committee on Good Governance and Public Accountability (“CGGPA”) of the 19th Congress.
80. Needless to state, the issues surrounding disbursement of the confidential funds of the OVP and DepEd are genuine issues of fact which require the presentation of evidence. It is only after the parties have presented their evidence when this Honorable Impeachment Court may make a determination on whether the Prosecution’s case actually rests on “mere speculation”.
81. Second, respondent Duterte’s supposed appeal with the COA will not shield her from an impeachment trial.
82. In Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan,* the Supreme Court highlighted the difference in the functions of the COA and prosecutorial bodies, which in that case was the Ombudsman, for crimes committed by public officers, stating that any finding by the COA will not prevent a prosecutorial body such as the Ombudsman from making its own investigation and determination on whether there is a crime to be prosecuted for which such public officer is accountable.
83. Similarly, in Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court reiterated that a report from the COA is not a pre-requisite before the Ombudsman investigates a complaint and determine probable cause to recommend the filing of charges on the basis of such complaint:
“Furthermore, although the Commission on Audit (COA) report may aid the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting its preliminary investigation, such report is not a prerequisite. Both the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state that the Office of the Ombudsman may undertake an investigation on complaint or on its own initiative. Therefore, with or without the report from COA, the Ombudsman can conduct a preliminary investigation. This Court has declared that the findings in a COA report or the finality or lack of finality of such report is irrelevant to the investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of probable cause.”
84. Similar to the Ombudsman, the House of Representatives may make its own determination whether there are grounds to initiate an impeachment proceeding against any impeachable officer irrespective of whether there are findings issued by or proceedings of another nature pending before other agencies such as the COA.
85. Likewise, the Honorable Impeachment Court, which is constitutionally mandated to try impeachable officials charged with the commission of impeachable offenses, has jurisdiction to pass upon these matters, regardless of the status of any audit conducted by the COA.
86. Third, respondent Duterte mistakenly claims there was no violation of the Joint Circular or of the General Appropriations Act with respect to the use of the confidential funds.”
87. One, the undisputed fact that the SDO turned over the confidential funds to another person, specifically VPSPG Nolasco and Lachica, upon the instruction of respondent Duterte, is a gross violation of Section 6.3.2 of the Joint Circular which mandates the SDO to personally disburse the confidential funds.
88. Even if VPSPG Nolasco and Lachica are supposedly the Security Officers of the DepEd and OVP, they had no business receiving and disbursing the confidential funds because, under the Joint Circular, Security Officers are designated as such only for the purpose of identifying who may have access to security information. They are not authorized to possess confidential funds.
89. Respondent Duterte committed conversion/malversation of confidential funds when she directed the SDOs to turn over the confidential funds to VPSPG Nolasco and Lachica
90. Two, confidential funds were not used for the purpose intended by law. Section 4.8. of the Joint Circular is clear when it requires that confidential funds shall only be used for confidential expenses.
91. In Dominguez v. Commission on Audit, the Supreme Court interpreted the guidelines on the use of confidential funds under Department of Internal and Local Government Memorandum Circular No. 99-65 in a similar manner:
“The rule is unequivocal that the use of funds for intelligence and confidential activities shall be limited to the enumerated items as provided, i.c., purchase of information; payment of rewards; rental and other incidental expenses relative to the maintenance of safehouses; and purchase of supplies and ammunitions, provision of medical and food aid, as well as payment of incentives or travelling expenses relative to the conduct of intelligence or confidential operations.
True, item II.3 did not prescribe the method on how to purchase information, the kind of rewards to be given, or the acts that warrant a reward. However, from which of those supposedly indeterminate subjects in item II.3 of MC No. 99-65 would the disallowed activities and/or programs fall under? Surely, the organization/federation training and provision of benefits for deputized barangay tanods or civilian volunteer organizations, the inventory and registration of unlicensed firearms, and the capability building on conflict transformation training for ACT for Peace-assisted Peace and Development Communities are not methods to purchase information. They are certainly not kinds of rewards, and neither are they acts that warrant rewards. They also likewise do not involve the maintenance of warehouses, and more so do not as well involve the purchase of supplies or ammunitions, the provision of medical and food aid, or the payment of incentives or travelling expenses.
XXXX
Again, there is nothing in the abovementioned justifications that indicate or imply that there was a purchase of information or a payment of a reward, a rental or an expense relative to the maintenance of a safehouse, or a purchase of supplies or ammunitions, the provision of medical and food aid, or the payment of incentives or travelling expenses. The fact that these activities resulted in some form of intelligence does not mean intelligence and confidential funds should or could have been used. This is not a standard considered or provided for in item Il.3, or anywhere in MC No. 99-65 for that matter. Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, 78 there is nothing in MC No. 99-65 that empowers local government units to use intelligence and confidential funds for activities and/or programs if the results thereof will fail under item [1.3 — in fact, item II, number 5 (Item II.5) stresses that the authority to use intelligence and confidential funds are subject to the limitations provided under numbers 1, 2, and 3. It should even be noted that the justifications proffered by the petitioner do not even appear as a performance indicator, a target, or an actual accomplishment listed in the Matrix of Accomplishments that the provincial government submitted to DILG together with its budget requests to allow the use of intelligence and confidential funds.” [Emphasis supplied]
92. Three, respondent Duterte’s claims that the OVP and DepEd’s documentary evidence for payment are supposedly consistent with its nature and are common practice in the agencies engaged in such operations likewise do not deserve merit.
93. Under COA Circular No. 88-293, the regulation on confidential and intelligence funds in force prior to the issuance of the Joint Circular, all agencies utilizing confidential funds must maintain all supporting documents for the transaction, which documents must include specific details on the transaction.
94. While the COA Circular No. 88-293 was superseded by the Joint Circular, this requirement on the maintenance of supporting documents is not inconsistent with any provision in the Joint Circular and is not among those provisions that were repealed and superseded under Section 9.0 of the Joint Circular. Hence, it is presumed to be in force and being practiced by agencies engaged in such operations. Needless to state, without this safeguard, it would be impossible for regulatory agencies to ensure that the funds being disbursed for confidential operations were being used for lawful purposes.
95. Finally, as discussed above, the findings of the COA are not binding on the HOR or on this Honorable Impeachment Court. The HOR may make its own independent determination of whether there are grounds to support the institution of impeachment proceedings against respondent Duterte pursuant to its exclusive authority to institute impeachment cases under Section 3(1) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
96. Furthermore, Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized offer shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
97. In this case, the legal presumption of malversation arose when respondent Duterte failed to account for the confidential funds. This presumption was further bolstered, among others, by the irregular disbursement of the confidential funds of the OVP and DepEd and the fact that the payees or recipients of the same were discovered to have been fictitious and non-existent. Respondent Duterte’s mere denial obviously does not rebut this presumption.
98. Furthermore, respondent Duterte is misleading this Honorable Impeachment Court by downplaying the COA’s disallowance of the amount of PhP73,287,000.00 in relation to the confidential funds of the OVP for the period of 21 to 31 December 2022 as a disallowance based on “form.”5?
99, A reading of the Notice of Disallowance No. 2024-002-100 (2022) shows that the amount was disallowed because they were unjustified. It highlights the “non-submission of documents evidencing the success of information gathering and/or surveillance activities” in order to justify the payments of rewards as well as the failure to specify whether the “tables, chairs, desktop computers and printers” allegedly purchased using confidential funds were intended for the confidential operations/ activities undertaken by the OVP.
100. Clearly, the disallowance was grounded on the fact that the confidential funds were not utilized for the purposes required under the Joint Circular, and is not merely based on “form.”
101. In the Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent Duterte claims that the HOR failed to show that the monies distributed to DepEd officials holding procurement-related functions and various field personnel indeed came from respondent Duterte or that the latter committed acts of bribery. Respondent Duterte also claims that the HOR failed to make out a case of graft and corruption or that she obtained public funds for personal gain or benefit for herself or another.
102. The arguments lack merit.
103. First, respondent Duterte does not even deny the distribution of monies to DepEd officials, choosing instead to argue that the HOR failed to show that the monies came from her. One thing is clear: monies were indeed distributed to DepEd officials, and they all came from respondent Duterte’s own Assistant Secretary, Sunshine Fajarda. As to the source of these monies, testimonies of witnesses during the inquiry in aid of legislation conducted by the CGGPA show that respondent Duterte played a role in these illegal transactions:
(a) Former DepEd Undersecretary Gloria Jumamil-Mercado testified that following her appointment as Head of Procuring Entity (HOPE), between February 2023 to September 2023, Assistant Secretary Sunshine Fajarda (“Asec. Fajarda”) summoned Usec. Mercado to her office and handed over nine (9) envelopes labelled “HOPE”, all while stating: “Galing kay VP.”5* She also narrated that sometime in October 2023, with the likelihood of a bidding failure for the DepEd Computerization Program being apparent, she was approached by Atty. Munsayac who implied to rig the procurement process.
(b) Dir. Resty C. Osias, Director for Human Resources of DepEd also revealed that Asec. Fajarda summoned him into her office and handed over envelopes containing cash four (4) times between April 2023 until September 2023. The envelopes contained cash between Php12,000.00 to Php15,000.00. He also corroborated Usec. Mercado’s narration about Atty. Munsayac’s proposal to bypass the procurement process of DepEd.
(c) DepEd Chief Accountant Ma. Rhunna L.Catalan testified that she affixed her signature to the liquidation report of DepEd’s confidential funds upon the “request” of Asec. Fajarda certifying that the supporting documents were complete and proper despite the fact that the supporting documents were not presented to her. Because of this, from February 2023 until September 2023, Asec. Fajarda gave her nine (9) envelopes, each containing Php25,000.00.
104. Second, the argument that the HOR failed to make out a case for graft and corruption is false.
105. What is clear is that during respondent Duterte’s stint as DepEd Secretary, monetary gifts were widely distributed, and Atty. Munsayac, respondent’s law school classmate and former spokesperson, sought to rig the bidding of the DepEd Computerization Program.
106. The very nature of the crimes charged against her, ie. bribery, corruption of public officers, and graft and corruption, is that these are acts done by and large in secrecy.55
107. In sum, it is incorrect for respondent Duterte to claim that the allegations of the DepEd officials are “mere personal inferences”. On the contrary, they establish a compelling case against respondent Duterte. The totality of the evidence that will be presented during trial will demonstrate that her conduct makes her unfit to ever hold public office.
On Article IV—
108. In the Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent Duterte claims that assertions regarding her ownership of undisclosed bank accounts are based solely on a 2016 online article. She thus argues that Senator Trillanes’ obtention of bank documents and records are inadmissible. She further argues that the fact that she was able to file her SALN is proof that she consistently complied with the law.
109. The contentions lack merit.
110. First, she misleads the Honorable Impeachment Court in claiming that this Article is only based on online publications. Respondent Duterte’s SALN is already a part of public records and therefore publicly available. They are no longer hearsay. The only matter left for determination is her real net worth, assets and properties as stated in her SALNs vis-a-vis her legitimate sources of income.
111. It is a matter of public record that Senator Trillanes had filed a plunder complaint against Former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte before the Office of the Ombudsman. Then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur Carandang stated in 2017 that the Trillanes copy of the bank records were “similar” to the AMLC records and that the former President had ill-gotten wealth. The AMLC records covered numerous banks: BPI and Banco de Oro, among many others.
112. Respondent Duterte has joint accounts with the former President. The SALNs must cover assets, liabilities, business interests and those of their relatives in government. The SALN of respondent Duterte should include cash on hand and cash in bank. Despite this, respondent Duterte’s SALNs, as submitted, do not indicate the foregoing bank accounts and the cash that they contain. A joint account should be reported as cash on hand.
113. More importantly, respondent Duterte herself concedes the existence of ultimate facts by admitting that Senator Trillanes has provided evidentiary facts in support of these same accusations. Whether any evidence given against the respondent Duterte is admissible or not can only be determined after trial and offer.
114. In any case, Republic Act No. 1405 explicitly excludes this case of impeachment. Although Section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation.5”
115. The authority of the Honorable Impeachment Court to allow the presentation of bank information cannot be diminished regardless of the claim of the respondent. The invocation by the respondent of Republic Act No. 1405 cannot prevent the court from receiving evidence regarding the bank accounts of the respondent. To repeat, the Honorable Impeachment Court is empowered to do so by the exception provided Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405.
116. Suffice it to state that the cited case of BSB Group, Inc.v. Sally Go’ is irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent to the impeachment proceedings.
117. Second. Respondent Duterte’s mere filing of her SALN from 2007 to 2017 is not a complete defense. The filing by respondent Duterte of her SALN is one thing; the filing of SALN which totally failed to declare, or otherwise failed to accurately declare, the value of some of her real and personal properties, along with her liabilities is another.
118. It is absurd for respondent Duterte to insist that the filing of her SALN constitutes compliance with the law. This is not the point. It is the failure to file the correct and accurate SALN that is the subject matter of Article IV of the Articles of Impeachment. A SALN is required to “be accomplished as truthfully, as detailed and as accurately as possible.”5? This, she failed to do.
119. It is also incorrect for her to claim that the acts committed during prior years are irrelevant and immaterial because her net worth in her previous SALN for 2016 are the basis for her succeeding SALN.
120. It must be stressed that respondent Duterte’s total net worth as indicated in her SALN is manifestly disproportionate to the income that she was earning as an elected official. Properties and cash were clearly omitted from her SALN.
121. In her time as vice-mayor or mayor of Davao City alone, her estimated annual income ranged only between approximately. Two Million Forty Thousand Pesos (PhP2,040,000.00) to Two Million Six Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (PhP2,640,000.00). Yet,
122. To reiterate, this patent omission to disclose properties and cash puts into question how she was able to acquire them. Such omission betrays intent to hide wealth grossly disproportionate to her legal income. Respondent Duterte is presumed to have illegally acquired those unlisted properties. She failed to prove otherwise in her Answer Ad Cautelam.
123. Further, respondent Duterte’s misrepresentation in these proceedings is patent in her false assertions. For instance, she plainly claims that the complaint omits her leave from public service. Had she thoroughly read the Articles of Impeachment, she would have easily read under paragraph 61 of the Impeachment Complaint that her 3-year hiatus from public office from 2013 to 2016 was indicated.
124. Third. Arguments on admissibility of evidence are premature at this point. The impeachment proceedings have just commenced, and the prosecution is yet to begin presenting and offering evidence for the appreciation of the Honorable Impeachment Court.
125. Questions of relevance, materiality, competence, and admissibility, are properly addressed to presiding officer, and the judges, as the case may be, when testimonial, documentary, and object evidence is presented to the Honorable Impeachment Court Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier.
126. Just as Respondent Duterte states on page 31 of the Answer ad Cautelam, the prosecution likewise “reserves the right to avail of the modes of discovery under pertinent rules”.
127. Finally, as to her general denial and false claims that all the allegations are mere conjectures, respondent Duterte is mistaken. There is certainty as to the existence of the evidentiary basis for the facts alleged in the Articles of Impeachment as can be gleaned from the timeframe and positions held by her which will show a continuing pattern of culpability. To describe the allegations in the Articles of Impeachment as insufficient and inadequate is an admission of her inability to refute or justify the evidence once brought to light in trial. In any case, the weight and admissibility of the evidence is best resolved after trial on the merits.
On Article V—
128. In the Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent Duterte argues that the assertions against her were based entirely on “uncorroborated” and “questionable” testimony of SPO4 Arturo Lascanas.
129. This contention gets ahead of the testimonies of SPO4 Arturo Lascanas and other potential witnesses yet to be presented in open court. The Lascafias supplemental affidavit submitted to the International Criminal Court has identified the other personalities who may corroborate respondent Duterte’s clear instructions as Davao City Mayor for them to abduct suspects, liquidate and bury them in quarries, to depart from street killings that attract the attention of the press.
130. There is no basis in casting doubt on the credibility of SPO4 Lascafias as he, in fact, has been admitted as witness under protection by no less than the International Criminal Court (ICC). Nevertheless, matters on discrediting a witness can very well be ventilated during Impeachment Trial proper, not on a mere Answer Ad Cautelam.
131. Also, the statements made by SPO4 Lascanas could not be merely disregarded under the Res Inter Alios Acta rule. Such rule admits of four (4) exceptions, to wit:
132. SPO4 Lascanias, as leader of the DDS, is a conspirator or even an agent of respondent Duterte who authorized the killing spree and operation tokhang as then Mayor of Davao City. He is a self-confessed DDS assassin who killed people with the express authority of the respondent Duterte and her father who is now in the Hague.
133. Thus, his statement is an admission of a conspirator or admission of an agent. It is exempted from the Res Inter Altos Acta rule and could very well be legally considered as evidence.
134. In any event, as mentioned above, whether the Lascanas testimony is uncorroborated, or reliable and straightforward, standing alone, is a matter properly dissected and passed upon during and after trial of the merits of the case. The Honorable Impeachment Court may not pass upon questions of credibility and probative value upon the mere say-so of the respondent as stated in her motion to dismiss disguised as an Answer Ad Cautelam.
135. Lastly, respondent Duterte argues that her act of authorizing the killing spree while she was still the Mayor of Davao City is a “pre-office’ act that cannot be a ground for an impeachment complaint. She then concluded that only acts committed during the incumbency of her Vice Presidency can be the subject of an impeachment complaint, vaguely citing the 1987 Constitution as basis. This, again, is misleading.
136. In the first place, murder is murder, regardless of when it was committed.
137. Moreover, no provision in the entire Constitution limits the impeachable acts only to those committed during the incumbency of the official. The Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
XXX
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
XKX
138. The above constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous. It did not qualify the impeachable acts as only those committed during the Presidency or Vice Presidency of the official. Thus, to interpret the same differently is legally infirm and misleading.
139. Historically, United States officials have been impeached and removed from office for actions committed prior to their current positions. Impeachment in the United States is not limited to misconduct committed during an official’s current term but can also include serious wrongdoing from earlier stages of their career.
140. In other words, impeachment may be grounded on serious misconduct that predates a public official’s assumption of office, provided that it involves the public official’s fitness to serve.
141. The Philippine legal framework on impeachment should reflect this same constitutional logic. Owing to the historical influence of the United States, the structure and interpretation of the Philippines’ laws on impeachment similarly emphasize public accountability, regardless of timing of the commission of the acts. The argument that respondent Duterte cannot be impeached for purported acts done before she assumed the Vice Presidency is therefore wrong.
On Article VI—
142. In the Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent Duterte argues that no specific acts constituting betrayal of public trust, culpable violations of the Constitution, and commission of High Crimes were alleged in the Articles of Impeachment. She contends that Article VI simply seeks to punish her for voicing dissent.
143. This is false.
144. The allegations in Article VI refer to respondent Duterte’s acts of political destabilization. The totality of her actions shows seditious intent against the sitting government. She hurled profanities against President Marcos, Jr. and other public officials. She threatened assassination and bodily harm against President Marcos, Jr., the First Lady and the Speaker of the House of Representatives; she sowed division and doubt on the Philippines’ position in the escalating tensions in the West Philippine Sea; she undermined police operations by publicly criticizing the police manhunt conducted to capture then-fugitive Pastor Apoilo Quiboloy; she urged the Commission on Audit not to comply with a subpoena issued by Congress and suborned her subordinates not to attend Congressional probes, in open defiance of the authority and powers of Congress; she physically obstructed the enforcement by the House of Representatives’ Office of the Sergeant-At-Arms (“HOR OSAA”) of a Transfer Order issued by Congress directing the transfer of Atty. Zuleika Lopez to the Mandaluyong Correctional Institution for Women; and she made public accusations of bribery and corruption in the Supreme Court which served to erode public confidence in the judiciary and the judicial system.
145. All these allegations do not show mere dissent. On the contrary, they show a series of acts and utterances diametrically opposed against the incumbent President and the current administration, aimed to destabilize the government. Ultimately, they demonstrate respondent Duterte’s utter lack of fitness to remain as the Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.
146. While respondent Duterte is entitled to the Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression, the same is not absolute.
147. In Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, the Supreme Court explained that while entering government service is not tantamount to the relinquishment of the constitutional right of expression, it is correct to conclude that they are subjected to a different degree of limitation of their freedom to speak their mind:
“It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment. Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public employment ‘must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.’ But there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for public employment. It is the Court's responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.” [Emphasis supplied]
148. It bears emphasis that respondent Duterte is the daughter of the former President of the country; a powerhouse politician from Mindanao whose family has established more than a decade-long dynasty; and, more importantly, occupies the second highest position in government. Obviously, respondent Duterte is no ordinary public official. Her acts, omissions, and utterances dangerously carry compelling weight and persuasion. Any act or utterance of respondent Duterte, especially those which cause the destabilization of the government, undermine the capacity and authority of the President, and disregard of the authority of governmental institutions have rippling effects throughout the country and its citizens.
149, In this regard, the Supreme Court has previously stated that “[w]ritings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself.”
150. Indeed, the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution “does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose.” It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.”
151. Respondent Duterte’s acts which cause the destabilization of the government; challenge the authority of the incumbent President; promote the blatant disregard for orderly governance; and incite sedition and utter disrespect for public authority, betray the very fabric of democracy. Said acts make it overwhelmingly apparent that respondent Duterte is unfit to hold public office, much more the second highest position in government.
152. At any rate, having admitted the statements, actions and inactions attributed to her, and in declaring that the same are candid expressions of her opinion about the present administration, in effect, respondent Duterte admits the violations imputed against her. Insofar as to the determination of whether these rise to the level of impeachable offense, remains for the Honorable Impeachment Court to decide.
153. Further, considering that she admitted the statements imputed to her, constituting the allegations in Article Vi, the Answer Ad Cautelam of respondent Duterte fails to tender an issue of fact.
On Article VII—
154. In the Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent Duterte argues that Article VII does not contain factual declarations constituting an impeachable offense.
155. Respondent Duterte is mistaken. Article VII is an amalgamation of, and repleads, all factual declarations in support of the foregoing Articles of Impeachment, which singly or collectively will secure a judgment of conviction against respondent Duterte. The evidence that will be presented for each of these Articles of Impeachment will surmount the burden of proof required from the undersigned Prosecutors.
Respondent’s prayer to dismiss the Articles of Impeachment on technical grounds must be denied on the ground of forum-shopping.
156. The Answer Ad Cautelam is a mere repetition of the allegations contained in respondent’s petition in the Supreme Court. The Answer Ad Cautelamis shopping for a friendlier forum which can hopefully accord relief that respondent has not obtained from her pending Supreme Court petition. Forum-shopping is frowned upon because it involves the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
157. Forum-shopping exists when a party institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
158. The plain language of the constitutional text “trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed” leaves no room for interpretation and forecloses the filing of a motion to dismiss before the Honorable Impeachment Court. A motion to dismiss is prohibited.
159. Thus, the Honorable Impeachment Court should ignore respondent’s claims that are tantamount to a motion to dismiss, including her prayer to resolve her affirmative defenses, and proceed to trial as directed by the plain text and meaning of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
160. In summary, the Articles of Impeachment are thoroughly drafted and contains sufficient allegations and evidence justifying a full-blown trial. It completely and sufficiently outlines the serious offenses committed by respondent Duterte including plotting assassinations, misappropriating public funds, and corruption—all backed by substantial evidence such as sworn testimonies and public records.
161. In contrast, the Answer Ad Cautelam merely relies on false allegations which are all refuted by legal precedents and Supreme Court rulings.
162. It is obvious from a simple reading of the Answer Ad Cautelam—which relies on misleading claims and baseless procedural objections—that the only legal strategy of the defense is to have the case dismissed and avoid trial. The reliefs prayed for in the Answer Ad Cautelam are indicative of her intent to have the impeachment dismissed as it is clear no prayer for acquittal was sought—only a dismissal of the case. This should not be countenanced.
163. These Articles of Impeachment highlight respondent Duterte’s unfitness for public office. The Honorable Impeachment Court should reject respondent Duterte’s desire for a dismissal without trial. The severity of the charges leaves no room for technical evasion. A trial is not only warranted but necessary to reinforce justice, uphold democratic principles, and affirm that no individual—regardless of rank or influence—stands above the law.
164. Public officials must be held accountable for impeachable offenses. Only exchanges of civility and a formal examination of evidence before an impartial court is required. TheFilipino people have a fundamental right to witness this process unfold.
No bloodbath is necessary. Let the trial begin.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Impeachment Court PROCEED TO TRIAL, render a JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION against respondent Vice President Sara Zimmerman Duterte, decree her REMOVAL from the Office of the Vice-President, and order her PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION from holding any public office in the Republic of the Philippines.
OTHER RELIEFS AND REMEDIES, as may be just and equitable under the premises, are also prayed for.
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